Famously, John Snow attempted to convince a critical professional audience that public water supplied to South London residents by private companies was a principal vector for the transmission of cholera. The result has been called the sine qua non of the ''epidemiological imagination,'' a landmark study still taught today. In fact, Snow twice attempted to prove public water supplies spread cholera to the South London population. His first, published in 1855, suffered from an incomplete data set that limited its descriptive and predictive import. In 1856, armed with new data, Snow published a more definitive study. This paper describes a previously unacknowledged methodological and conceptual problem in Snow's 1856 argument. We review the context of the South London study, identify the problem and then correct it with an empirical Bayes estimation (EBE) approach. The result hopefully revitalizes Snow's research as a teaching case through the application of a contemporary statistical approach. r
Introduction
Famously, John Snow attempted to convince a critical professional audience that public water supplied to South London residents by private companies was a principal vector for the transmission of cholera. He did this in two separate studies, the first of a neighborhood cholera outbreak in the Broad Street area of Soho (Snow, 1855, pp. 38-56; Smith, 2002) and the second a larger scale study of cholera in South London (Snow, 1855, pp. 71-92) . In the latter Snow attempted to assign variable rates of cholera in the population to private water companies serving central South London (the Southwark-Vauxhall and Lambeth Waterworks companies) to prove cholera was far more intense in one company's service area than the others.
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The result is the sine quo non of what Ashton (1974) called ''the epidemiological imagination.'' and a textbook example for generations of students (Vandenbroucke, Rooda, & Beukers, 1991; pp. 971-972) in epidemiology (Rothman, 2002) , medical geography (Melnick, 2002 1982, p. 179) and public health (Carvalho, Lima, & Kriebel, 2004) .
Geographers have focused their attention on Snow's Broad Street neighborhood study and, McLeod argues, its ''dot map that makes him a hero in medical geography'' (Koch, 2005, chapter 6; McLeod, 2000, p. 923) . For epidemiologists and public health officials, as well as some historical cartographers (Robinson 1982, p. 179) , it was the South London study (and its map) that deserved heroic status. In this study, Snow faced two daunting technical problems in an attempt to prove a causal relationship between water supply and cholera. First, his data set of deaths due to cholera, compiled from field records reported by local registrars and collected by London's General Registrar Office (GRO), were incomplete. Second, available population figures for each water company were not easily transposed to the scale of the registration district or sub-district in a manner that would permit precise spatial assignment. The result inhibited even a general calculation of local mortality ratios on the basis of water supply areas and prevented completion of the natural experiment Snow promised in his landmark work, the second edition of On the Mode of Communication of Cholera (Snow, 1855) , hereafter referred to as MCC-2.
In 1856, armed with additional data (Simon, 1856) , Snow attempted to extend the incomplete field using a then recently compiled but still incomplete inventory of deaths from cholera at registration district and sub-district levels through the simple expedient of allocating cases that could not otherwise be spatially located to water companies according to the best estimate then available. Snow then attempted to improve his finding's resolution by applying the resulting mortality rates at the sub-district level. The result, he boasted, ''supplies a greater amount of statistical evidence than was ever brought to bear on a medical subject'' (Snow, 1856, p. 248) .
We demonstrate that in this second attempt Snow made not merely minor arithmetic errors but more importantly critical, conceptual mistakes that adversely affected his results. While his findings appear to conform to mortality ratios based on the GRO's records of cholera deaths-a signal proof of accuracy for Snow (Snow, 1856, p. 10 )-a comparison of variance for the two distributions is unimpressive, and in a few sub-districts Snow's calculated mortality is wildly different from those actually reported (Vinten-Johansen, Brody, Paneth, Rachman, & Rip, 2003, pp. 275-276) .
The result is not merely a statistician's quibble. Snow's goal in the 1856 paper was to define a statistical process that would serve to predict the incidence of cholera on the basis of local water supply. His intent was to prove through this methodology that cholera was a waterborne disease. We demonstrate here that Snow's statistical process, one central to then evolving disease studies, was flawed. Both identifying its problems and demonstrating their corrective serves both an historical evaluation of Snow's work and contemporary studies in which predictive statistical models, of which Snow's was an early example, are frequently employed.
Here we first correct for Snow's arithmetic errors and then employ an empirical Bayes estimation (EBE) (Balsted, 2004) , ''method of moments'' approach whose a priori perspective offers a critical corrective to Snow's system of calculation (Bailey & Gatrell, 1995, pp. 303-307; Martuzzi & Elliott, 1996) . We then reconstruct Snow's findings, demonstrating a more robust comparison of variance that shrinks unacceptably large differences between Snow's conclusions and the GRO's mortality records in individual registration sub-districts.
The result offers important insights into both Snow's thinking and the limits of the calculations he presented in his works. In addition, it appears to present an unusually clear example of the benefits of the EBE approach to a class of ''modifiable area unit problems'' (Openshaw, 1984) in which area unit size employed in an analysis, and the relationship between different area units, effect the result (Cromley & McLafferty, 2002, p. 110) .
Cholera
Cholera is a bacterial disease causing intense diarrhea that has swept the globe in a series of global pandemics ending with the recent, sixth pandemic, in the latter half of the twentieth century (CDC, 2000) . The first outbreak began in India early in the 19th century and spread to England in 1831 in the first of four 19th century epidemics occurring in 1831 -1833 , 1848 -1850 , 1853 -1854 , and 1866 (Morris, 1976 . In part as a result of cholera's mortality rate of between 20 and 25 percent (Morris, 1976, p. 13) , the nature of cholera-was it air or waterborne-and the means of its diffusion were subjects of intense professional
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debate (for a review see Koch, 2005) . Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that in the second-half of the 19th century, cholera was the clinical focus of different theories of disease generation and diffusion. The problem, as an analysis of Snow's study of cholera in London in the 1850s makes clear, was conceptual and statistical at once.
Grand experiment I: 1855
In 1852 William Farr, then chief statistician of the GRO in London, published a detailed 400-page study of cholera in the years 1848-1849 that concluded public water supplies contributed to the spread of what Farr believed was a fundamentally airborne disease (Eyler, 1979; Farr, 1852) . While he believed water contributed to the disease's diffusion Farr also argued that it would be difficult or impossible to prove its complicity at the scale of Metropolitan London where many private companies competing for customers, often at the level of the neighborhood street. In the second edition of MCC-2, Snow promised a grand experiment based on data from the 1854 London epidemic that would ''thoroughly test the effect of water supply on the progress of cholera'' (Snow, 1855, p. 75) .
Using records collected by Farr's GRO registrars, and his own research, Snow developed a list of cholera deaths in 1854 in central South London supplied by two competing companies, Southwark-Vauxhall Company and the Lambeth Waterworks Company (Snow, 1855, p. 76) . This data, which was to serve as numerator in his calculation of mortality rates, was based on data not only from registrars reporting to Farr but also on Snow's investigation of a limited set of sub-districts in the early weeks of the epidemic (Snow, 1854) . To be useful, however, it needed a denominator based on service populations for the two companies. ''All that was required,'' he wrote, ''was to learn the supply of water to each individual house where a fatal attack of cholera might occur'' (Snow, 1855, p. 75) . Data permitting assignment of cholera deaths to either of the water suppliers was unavailable, however. While Snow was able to construct precise mortality ratios at these levels for earlier epidemics, for example, those of 1849 and 1853, he could not do the same for the 1854 epidemic that was his focus (Snow, 1855, p. 73) . ''I was unable at the time to show the relation between the supply of houses in which fatal attacks took place and the entire supply of each district and subdistrict [sic] , on account of the latter circumstance not being known'' (Snow, 1856, p. 7) .
What Snow did have was a return to Parliament by water suppliers reporting the total number of houses they respectively supplied in Metropolitan London (Snow, 1855, p. 72) . But because these returns did not specify the location of those houses Snow had only a general total of South London households supplied by each of the water companies as the denominator for the mortality ratios he sought to construct (Rothman, 2002, p. 61 (Carvalho et al., 2004) , and with Snow's smaller scale Broad Street study, the basis for Snow's enduring fame (VintenJohansen et al., 2002, pp. 392-396) .
While suggestive, the results were considered definitive neither by Snow nor his critics. They were too coarse to permit precise water supply assignments to homes of decedents, preventing the construction of cholera mortality ratios in the registration sub-districts of South London where ''the mixing of the [water] supply is of the most intimate kind. The pipes of each company go down all the street, and into nearly all the courts and alleys'' (Snow, 1855, p. 74 ). Snow lacked a mechanism to apply his analysis at a scale or resolution permitting the transformation of gross mortality into precise mortality ratios based on population for the two water companies.
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Snow's map in MCC-2, best seen today in a digital version online (http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/ snow/snowmap2_1854.html) presents the problem in graphic terms. While he could delineate the general service areas of the two water companies, and the area they served jointly, he could not join the mortality of the registration district and subdistrict populations occurring within those jurisdictions in the map. Simply, there was no way to assign cholera mortality on the basis of population in the ARTICLE IN PRESS large area in which both companies vied for customers. Without that he could not precisely allocate deaths to either water company or effectively calculate the mortality ratios for registration districts or sub-districts, jurisdictional levels at which mortality data was recorded by the GRO. His map, therefore, was of service areas but not of cholera incidence. Snow therefore lacked a definitive argument-cartographic or statistical-that water was the principal variable explaining the wide variation in mortality ratios between water suppliers, a point not lost on either his contemporary critics (for example, Parks, 1855; Farr, 1853) or Snow's later admirers (Frost, 1936, p. 179) (Fig. 2) .
Grand experiment II: 1856
In 1856, London Board of Health medical officer John Simon published a paper that provided the necessary data to translate Snow's remarkable difference in mortality between customers of the two companies into comparable rates of mortality among their customers at a relatively fine resolution. Simply, registration district and registration sub-district populations developed by the GRO were added to the picture, permitting a denominator to be added and precise mortality ratios to be constructed for the two water companies. ''In the Report on the Cholera Epidemics of London as affected by the Consumption of Impure Water, lately written by Mr. Simon, and published by the General Board of Health, there is a statement of the number of houses supplied by each of the water companies respectively in each district and subdistrict'' (Snow, 1856, p. 7) . The former were areas for which civil statistics (births and deaths) were by law reported (Registration of Births, 1835) on a weekly basis to the GRO while the latter were registration district sub-divisions, each with a single registrar charged with collection of birth and mortality data (Eyler, 1979, p. 43 ).
Simon effectively completed Snow's grand experiment, calculating mortality ratios of 13 deaths per 10,000 persons in the Southwark-Vauxhall service area compared to 3.7 per 10,000 persons for Lambeth Water Company customers in the 1853-1854 South London epidemic. ''Of the 3476 tenants of the Southwark and Vauxhall Company who died of cholera in 1853-1854, two-thirds would have escaped if their water supply had been like their neighbors'' he concluded, and ''of the much larger number-tenants of both companies-who died in 1848-1849, also two-thirds would have escapedy'' (Simon, 1856, p. 9) . Not to be outdone, Snow then used Simon's data (after correcting what he believed were jurisdictional errors (Snow, 1856, p. 7) to construct a statistical model of mortality at first registration district and then registration subdistrict levels that would generate mortality results similar to those that actually occurred and were reported by local registrars to the GRO (VintenJohansen et al., 2003, p. 274) . Snow sought in this way a statistical argument at least as compelling as one earlier constructed by Farr (1852) to demonstrate a clear, inverse relationship between increasing altitude and decreasing rates of cholera per 10,000 persons.
Snow: registration districts
The heart of Snow's approach, and the problems inherent in it, were distilled in his Table V (Fig. 3) . In it (Snow, 1856, p. 17) Snow attempted first to calculate the number of deaths for each of ten registration districts for each of the two water suppliers, and then to calculate their respective mortality per 10,000 persons in those registration districts, based on 1851 population data, in a manner that returned a general mortality ratio for each of the two water supply areas. To do this Snow divided the water supply of all houses in each registration district in which fatal attacks of cholera occurred by the estimated population of each district. He then multiplied the result by 10,000.
Thus for homes supplied by Southwark-Vauxhall Company in St. Savior, Southwark, registration district, Snow divided 406 (houses in which fatal attacks occurred) by the estimated registration district population served by the company (19, 617) to return a mortality ratio, after multiplying by 10,000 of 207 (206.963). Finally, Snow calculated general mortality rates from cholera for both water companies (160 per 10,000 and 27 per 10,000) by the simple, global expedient of dividing total deaths per water company by total estimated population for each service area. These ratios are given in the table in the final row in the two columns for mortality per 10,000 persons per water supply area.
A problem in this approach was how Snow addressed data lacking spatial assignment: there were 623 houses in which cholera occurred that could not be assigned reflexively to any single district nor to either of the two water supplier areas. Snow assigned them on the basis of an a priori summary location parameter, the global mean ratio of deaths per company. ''I could not be wrong in dividing the non-ascertained cases between the two companies in the same proportion as those which were ascertained, and I have done so at the foot of Table V, in order to obtain a complete view of the influence of the water supply during the whole epidemic of 1854'' (Snow, 1856, p. 9) . While Snow's strong conviction that unassigned cases mirrored general pattern of cases was reasonable a priori, the variations in distribution argue for smoothing the allocation of unassigned deaths according to occurrence by district and company. Snow might equally have assumed that unassigned cases reflected mistakes by individual registrars and that the non-ascertained cases would be better distributed by local means by district. Further, any and all variations in density of homes per district (6.4-7.8 persons per house), location, population (17,805-140,000 persons), and socioeconomic status of the registration district might argue for the eccentric assignment of these cases.
No less critically, Snow's final figures of relative morality by water supplier for each registration district estimated directly from a priori through his reflexive use of a global mean, 160 deaths per 10,000 for Southwark-Vauxhall and 27 deaths per 10,000 for Lambeth Waterworks Company. This in effect negated, or at least diminished the resolution returned through his district-by-district analysis. These problems make Snow's mortality ratios suspect and their application to the registration sub-district level problematic.
Registration sub-districts
Snow then attempted to improve the resolution of his findings by transposing his conclusions from the level of the registration district to that of the registration districts' 31 constituent sub-districts, the scale required if the results were to be precisely mapped.
2 In this manner, a moveable area unit problem was fully engaged. The effect of Snow's a priori assumptions calculated at the level of the registration district in his Table V (here Fig. 3 ) thus were folded into his final calculations at the level of the 31 sub-districts in his Table VI (here Fig. 4) , the level at which his model was to be completed.
Minor arithmetic errors with a real but minimal effect on the table's results can be found in Snow's calculations at the level of both registration district and sub-district analysis, not surprising in the work ARTICLE IN PRESS of a physician who carried out all his computations with paper and pencil after a full day of medical practice.
3 For example, Snow miscalculated deaths per 10,000 in Christchurch registration sub-district as 57 rather than, correctly, 50 deaths per 10,000 persons ((82/16149) Â 10,000). Nor do all his columns necessarily sum correctly.
In his Table VI (Snow, 1856, p. 18) Snow calculated sub-district deaths per 10,000 persons on the basis of population and recorded deaths, using the previous table's general mortality ratios (160 per 10,000 and 27 per 10,000) for each of the two water suppliers in each registration sub-district. Snow again calculated a final mortality ratio per 10,000 persons globally-from the totals of population and deaths in the ''Totals'' column taken from his totals in Table V of 4740 deaths to population of 440,264 served by the two companies rather than by summing his calculated findings row-by-row in Table VI (yielding only 4175 and a ratio of 94.83). Snow then compared the result with the mortality reported by GRO data. ''It will be observed that the calculated mortality bears a very close relation to the real mortality in each subdistrict. This relation exists with regard to the real mortality in each subdistrict'' (Snow, 1856, p. 10) . His result appeared ARTICLE IN PRESS Table VI : registration sub-distribct mortality based upon district level calculations (Snow, 1856, p. 19 
Results
Basic statistical tests, available to us but not to Snow, suggest his conclusion was less than convincing (Fig. 5) . While paired samples correlations suggest a high degree of correlation between Snow's outcome and one based on the Registrar-General's findings (.907)-his hypothesis-the real story is told by a paired samples test. At a 95% confidence interval the lower and upper bounds of Snow's calculations of population mortality for both companies are unacceptably high. Most critically, the lower bound is well above 0.0, a clear sign of problems (Norusˇis, 1999, pp. 223-224) . The .002 says at that level of significance (95%) that Snow's hypothesis that his projected calculations based on mortality by water supplier agreed with the Registrar-General's realized mortality is unlikely.
A quick visual check of the data adds substance to these statistical cautions. In several registration sub-districts in Table VI Snow's predictions are clearly inaccurate (Vinten-Johansen et al., 2003, pp. 275-276) . In Putney, for example, Snow predicted 160 deaths per 10,000 persons compared to the 17 per 10,000 reported by the Registrar-General's figures in Snow's work. In the more populated St. George, Southwark registration district, the subdistrict of Borough Road reported 171 deaths per 10,000 where Snow's method predicted 104. While Snow was content with the ''very close'' general relation observed in his tables (Snow, 1856, p. 10) it would not serve, today, as sufficiently robust.
Combined mortality for both companies, Snow's penultimate column, gives an erroneous sum of 4744 persons rather than, correctly, 4175 persons. Total population for all sub-districts in 1851 is not 482,435, as Snow's totals showed, but 482,399 persons. More critically, his totals of deaths per 10,000 living resulted from global calculations (Fig. 3) that ignored the detail of the registration districts he had worked so hard to create. Thus, for example, his calculations generate 4175 deaths if summed by sub-district, omitting 569 cases in his Table VI , and resulting in an actual ratio of 95.08 deaths per 10,000 persons served by the two water companies.
Snow calculated mortality at the registration subdistrict level based on the ratio of cholera deaths (160 per 10,000 persons for Southwark-Vauxhall and 27 per 10,000 persons for Lambeth Waterworks Company) returned in his Table V (Fig. 3) . Snow ''lost'' in his calculations several thousand registration district residents living in registration districts (and sub-districts) on streets in which no deaths occurred. He was aware of this problem, an apparent artifact of Simon's data set, but had no way to adjust his population figures. ''Instead of being able to compare, as I could wish, the mortality in the houses supplied by each company with the exact number of houses supplied, I have only been able to compare it with the number of houses in the streets in which deaths occurred'' (Snow, 1856, p. 8) . The result adversely affected the resulting ratios based on population in his attempt to calculate mortality at the sub-district level.
Bayesian analysis

First stage
Snow's minor arithmetic errors are insufficient to explain the problems suggested by the two-tailed significance test or the lower bounding, however. For that it is necessary to turn again to the a priori assumptions of Table V approach (Press, 2003, p. 212 ) offered a useful strategy to combine Snow's belief with Snow's registration district data set in a manner permitting a better allocation of the problematic cases. EBE provided reasonable starting estimates, allowing for their refinement in the process, and significantly, a careful test of Snow's a priori, locative decisions. This identified as problematic Snow's decision to allocate unascertained cases on the basis of prior distribution.
In general, a Bayesian approach provides a means by which existing but incomplete or missing data sets can be reviewed and the assumptions based upon their use critiqued. The strength of the EBE version of Bayesian analysis is its utility in estimating parameters of distribution without the necessity of assessing parameters of a priori distribution as would be done in conventional Bayesian statistics. Once estimated, in this paper these parameters are used in a hierarchical way as priors for conventional Bayesian prediction. That is, the first stage of this analysis uses Snow's estimates based on his analysis of Simon's data and the subsequent stage involves Snow's comparison of the resulting calculations with the GRO's data on cholera incidence.
Here we summarize our application of the EBE ''method of moments,'' approach to Snow's data (Bailey & Gatrell, 1995, pp. 306, 329; Martuzzi & Elliott, 1996) . It is necessary to note parenthetically the complex and robust literature on EBE methodologies whose relation to this problem, and by extension others of its type, will require a separate, more technical paper now in preparation. In our current application Snow's belief in the complicity of the Southwark-Vauxhall company's water in the evidence, and the data returned by the RegistrarGeneral, set the stage for a two-stage analysis. First, we allocate the unknown cases in Snow's Table V using an a priori distribution reflecting Snow's belief in the complicity of Southwark-Vauxhall Company water. In the second stage we estimate distribution of deaths by sub-district conditional upon the Registrar-General's records in the final row of Snow's Table VI. For simplicity's sake, we describe here the general procedure using only the Lambeth Waterworks Company registration districts although our final analysis obviously required the approach be calculated for each water supplier in all registration districts.
In general terms, the first stage EBE methodology permits direct estimation of two parameters, sample variance (f) and a pooled mean (g), critical to the weighting formula. We followed Snow's a priori assumptions and similarly used the global mean (total cholera deaths in Lambeth/total deaths for both companies in each registration district) to calculate variance (f) and the pooled mean (g). We did so, however, in a manner that took full account of district variations and assured integrity of population and case data across all districts. This permitted us to employ not Snow's rough global totals but those in which registration district figures were summed.
The prior mean (g), 4 defined here as cholera per district i for each water company (here we use Lambeth Waterworks for ease of description), was summed and then divided by the total number of cholera deaths. Next, a weighted sample of var- iances (f) was calculated. 5 The results returned, g ¼ 411=4177 (equalling .09983) and f equals .007333, were then used to in a weighting factor (wi ¼ f=ðf þ g=ni)) where ni is the number of deaths from cholera in a district. Estimation of the posterior distribution of unassigned cases to each registration district was then carried out using the Bayes estimation formula ðy ¼ g þ wiðri À gÞÞ. The table in Fig. 6 compares Snow's original data for both water suppliers and those returned by the EBE approach allocating ''non-ascertained'' and original cases by district.
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Bayesian analysis
Second stage
The results from the first stage at the district level provide estimates of parameters of the a priori at the sub-district level then used to estimate deaths associated with the two companies. The assumption here is that ''equivalent past experience'' should prevail and the best estimate for a posteriori is merely allocation of deaths according to the registration districts re-cast by population in streets where deaths occurred. The resulting revised figures for the registration districts (Table V) then were used as a priori data to calculate new estimates at the registration sub-district level conditional upon registrar's records.
For the sub-districts in St. Saviour, and Christchurch in Southwark registration district (pop. 19,252 person) , for example, the 467.96 cholera deaths attributed to the Southwark-Vauxhall Company in the reworked Table V were allocated to the two constituent sub-districts, Christchurch (pop. 2, 915) and St. Savior (pop. 16, 337) , in effect, on the basis of the percentage of registration district population for each (.1584 versus .8486) . In the final iteration of the model this assigned 70.86 deaths to Christchurch and 397.135 to St. Savior, a change reflecting the addition of previously unassigned cases. Fig. 7 presents a summary of the conclusions of this approach comparing (a) 105 deaths per 10,000 persons based on actual deaths reported by local registrars (b) Snow's 108 deaths per 10,000 persons based on his calculations and (c) those returned by the EBE approach. The last three columns present the deaths per sub-district calculated on the basis of those reported and the 623 unassigned deaths allocated, sub-district-by-sub-district, through the EBE process.
Because Snow calculated deaths per 10,000 persons using a global mean both his and the RegistrarGeneral's mortality rate, Snow's benchmark, are here recalculated by summing deaths per 10,000 persons per district. The effect is observable in the estimated mortality, reflecting both the skewed nature of the data and the problem of the unassigned cases.
Clearly, the EBE approach more precisely agrees with Snow's interpretation of the observed result based on the global mean. Confidence and significance testing improved dramatically with the EBE calculations. At a 95% confidence interval the range between lower and upper bounds changed from 11.5094 (lower) and 46.0124 (upper) where Snow's findings and the registrars' reported deaths were compared to À6.64908 and 27.7457, for the Bayesian recalculation. In the latter, the upper and lower bounds were comfortably set around the 0.0 point, where they should be. T-test results changed from 3.405 based on Snow's calculation of mortality for both water suppliers to 1.253 and the registrar's results, a significant improvement that now argues the likelihood of his model's efficacy in predicting realized mortality on the basis of water supplier assignments. In its proven congruence between his sub-district calculations and the reported findings of mortality during the epidemic by the local registrars this approach in effect proves Snow's thesis, albeit 150 years after the fact.
Graphically, the result permits the addition of cholera mortality ratios to Snow's map of water supply areas (Fig. 2) . In effect, the map gains depth, represented in Fig. 8 through a map in which district mortality rates are combined in the water supply areas of Lambeth Water Company, SouthwarkVauxhall Water Company, and the service area they shared. It was this depth of analysis Snow originally sought in his 1855 study but, without population data, was unable to achieve.
Discussion
Snow attempted to develop a statistical model with predictive capabilities that stands today as a landmark event in disease studies. While his overall goal was to prove the waterborne nature of cholera
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5 EBE method of moments formula calculates variance in the following manner: is f ¼ ð P niðri À gÞ2= P niÞ À g=n where ri is the ratio of cholera deaths for Lambeth in district i and n is the typical number of cholera deaths by either Southwark and Vauxall companies.
his methodological goal was a type of modeling that in the mid-1850s was in its infancy. We have attempted to demonstrate in this paper not simply that his methodology was limited but more importantly that its limits are (or should be) evident. Using the global mean in his creation of the rates in Snow's Table V was an error even then, one that gave the appearance of congruence with the GRO's data but in the process lost the specificity of the data he was considering. Here we demonstrated that problems inherent in Snow's methodology, and especially in his transposition between registration district and sub-district levels, could be corrected using a modern EBE approach.
One cannot criticize Snow for a failure to have the statistical expertise of modern researchers. His work was, as he claimed, among the most rigorous statistical treatments of its day. Nor is it hard to understand the failure of more modern epidemiologists and spatial analysts to perceive the problems ARTICLE IN PRESS Fig. 7 . Comparison of mortality ratios based on observed deaths, Snow's model, and the EBE approach advanced in this paper. ''Bayes'' deaths for Southwark-Vauxhall and Lambeth companies include allocation of the 623 previously unassigned deaths to sub-districts. These are contrasted with ''Total cholera deaths'' assigned by Snow.'' inherent in Snow's response to the problems he faced. Because Snow's study is a foundation piece of the modern epidemiological research paradigm (Carvalho et al., 2004, p. 422) , attention has focused on the conclusions in Snow's Table VI , not the problems embedded in his Table V (Vinten-Johansen et al., 2003, pp. 273-277) . And, perhaps, Snow's fame has inhibited an unbiased review of his method and results.
It was through a review of Snow's South London study as a potential example for a computerized mapping class that the problem was first identified and later confirmed through confidence tests. A resolution using an EBE approach seemed to be the logical answer (Martuzzi & Elliott, 1996) . Certainly, that choice offered a range of benefits that extends beyond correction of an historical data set. Pedagogically, epidemiologists in the past have lamented Snow's failure to create a real case cohort study permitting the construction of risk ratios based on water supplier or other factors (Rothman, 2002, p. 86) . That lament assumed Snow went no further than the 1855 study, however. The 1856 paper considered here provides the potential for rigorous risk analysis among cohorts at not one but two levels of data. In addition, Snow's data offers modern instructors a critical example of the difficulties that arise when data collected at one level is transposed to another.
Finally, we believe the problems Snow faced not simply in his registration district calculations but in transposing them to the level of the registration subdistrict provide a critical example of the small area unit problem and the difficulties invoked as data are transposed from level to level. In an era of increasingly digital recording and storage of data at different scales (enumeration district, census district, county, regional, state, etc.) the problem is one that increasingly confronts contemporary health researchers (Kirby, 1996; Wakefield & Elliott, 1999) . From this perspective Snow's work remains a model of imaginative thinking, and in this study, a practical caution of the problems in transposition from one data level to another. For us, the results not only suggest the potential of the EBE approach but also and as importantly give to Snow's historical study a contemporary methodological standing.
